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ABSTRACT 
 Over the past decade, Southeast Asian countries have struggled to devise effective 
responses to China’s efforts to assert its claims in the South China Sea. This thesis aims 
to explain why some of those responses have been more successful than others. Using 
five case studies from 2012–2020, this thesis examines how the following four factors 
account for the success or failure of Vietnamese and Malaysian responses: increased 
external balancing with the U.S., increased internal balancing, increased coercive 
diplomacy, and stronger diplomatic support from the international community. The thesis 
finds that successful responses rely on a combination of internal balancing with coercive 
diplomacy and international support. It finds only weak evidence that countries in 
Southeast Asia engage in external balancing in response to China’s actions in the region. 
These conclusions suggest that the United States should increase its diplomatic and 
military cooperation with Southeast Asian partners in ways that enhance their capacity to 
deploy maritime forces and generate international support in response to Chinese 
assertiveness. Future research should examine whether increased military cooperation 
with middle powers such as India and Australia may contribute to more successful 
outcomes. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. REGIONAL RESPONSES TO CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA ............................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................1 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2 
1. Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-Making and the South
China Sea ........................................................................................2 
2. South China Sea Disputes have Implications for
UNCLOS .........................................................................................5 
3. Regional Responses to China’s Assertiveness in the South
China Sea ........................................................................................6 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .......................9 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................10 
1. Research Method .........................................................................11 
2. Sources and Application ..............................................................12 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE .............12 
II. VIETNAM’S RESPONSES TO CHINA (2014–2019) .....................................15 
A. VIETNAM AND CHINA’S RAPPROCHEMENT ..............................15 
B. VIETNAM’S DOMESTIC DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT ..................17 
C. VIETNAM’S STRATEGIC PARTNERS AND MILITARY
PURCHASES ...........................................................................................19 
D. THE VANGUARD BANK INCIDENT .................................................22 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF VIETNAM’S RESPONSE .......27 
F. LOOKING FORWARD ..........................................................................28 
G. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................29 
III. MALAYSIA’S RESPONSES TO CHINA (2013–2020) ...................................33 
A. ORIGINS OF CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS AT LUCONIA
SHOALS ...................................................................................................33 
B. THE WEST CAPELLA INCIDENT .....................................................42 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................48 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................51 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSION .................................................................51 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND U.S. POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................56 
viii 
C. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH ..........................................59 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................61 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Vietnam Military Expenditure 2014–2018, actual amounts and as 
percentage of GDP. ....................................................................................18 
Figure 2. Vietnam’s Southern EEZ and Oil Exploration Block 06–01. ....................24 
Figure 3. Map of Luconia Shoals. .............................................................................34 
  
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1MDB One Malaysia Development Berhad 
A2/AD  Anti-Access/Area Denial 
ADMM+ ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus 
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
AIS  Automated Identification System 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ARF  ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BN  Barisan Nasional 
BRI  Belt and Road Initiative 
CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
CoC  Code of Conduct 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CLCS  Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
COVID-19  Coronavirus Disease of 2019 
CSIS  Center for Strategic and International Studies 
EAS East Asian Summit 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ESSCOM Eastern Sabah Security Command 
FAC Fast Attack Craft 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HMAS Her or His Majesty’s Australian Ship 
HYSY Haiyang Shi You 
JI Jemaah Islamiyah 
MMEA Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MSDF Maritime Self Defense Force 
ND Nipple Down 
OBOR One Belt, One Road 
xii 
PH Pakatan Harapan 
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
PN  Perikatan Nasional 
RMN Royal Malaysian Navy 
RSIS S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
SAM Surface to Air Missile 
SCS South China Sea 
SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training 
SLOCS Sea Lines of Communications 
SOE State Owned Enterprise 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UAS Unmanned Aerial Systems 
UNCLOS United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea 
USS United States Ship 
xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the individuals who have helped me 
complete my thesis project. Thank you to Dr. Michael Malley and Dr. Christopher Twomey 
for their detailed guidance throughout this entire process. Thank you to the Graduate 
Writing Center for helping me become a better writer and critical thinker. I also would like 
to thank all the individuals in the Navy who have helped me get into NPS. I want to 
especially thank my mother, Carol Halper, and Caroline Zuccarello for their incredible 
support, and patience with me during my time here at NPS. Both of you continue to inspire 
me to never let go of my goals and to keep moving forward with my naval career. 
  
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1 
I. REGIONAL RESPONSES TO CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why have some Southeast Asian responses to Chinese actions in the South China 
Sea been more successful than others? Various countries in Southeast Asia have responded 
differently to China’s assertiveness in the region. Some countries have taken a passive 
posture to China’s growing presence, while others have chosen to respond more 
aggressively against China’s growing influence. This research will examine the differing 
regional responses to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea to determine under what 
conditions each country’s policy choices have been successful in causing Chinese vessels 
to withdraw from disputed territories and under what conditions these choices have  
led to failure. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The South China Sea is one of the most critical waterways in the world: it allows 
for the uncontested passage of a majority of the international world’s commerce. In fact, 
over $5.3 trillion in worldwide commerce transits annually through the South China Sea.1 
In addition to historical fishing grounds, the South China Sea is also recognized to be rich 
in various natural resources such as natural gas and hydrocarbon deposits.2 
Over the years, many countries in Southeast Asia have grown suspicious of China’s 
intentions and have responded in different ways to China’s maritime assertiveness. In 
addition, China’s expanding presence in the region has generated critical debates 
throughout the world to include the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration case under the 
United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as a dynamic shift 
 
1 “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?,” ChinaPower Project, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, DC, accessed August 2, 2019, http://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-
transits-south-china-sea/. 
2 “International—U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),” U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, Washington, DC, October 15, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-
interest/South_China_Sea. 
2 
in United States foreign policy toward the region.3 This research topic has received 
substantial research already, as discussed in the following section. The topic remains 
important for Southeast Asia academic scholars, U.S. and Southeast Asian policy makers, 
as well as other Asian-Pacific political scientists. 
This thesis aims to contribute to previously written academic studies on the 
differing types of coercion to identify the reasons why countries have responded differently 
to China’s actions in the SCS. In particular, this thesis will analyze why some policy 
choices made by Southeast Asian countries have been more successful than others in 
confronting Chinese territorial aggression in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the result 
of this research finding could contribute to United States contemporary South China Sea 
policy by providing U.S. policy makers with knowledge about the reasons why Southeast 
Asian countries behave differently in response to China’s emboldened presence in the 
region. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to understand and identify reasons why countries are responding differently 
to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, this analysis will require an understanding 
of the recent events surrounding South China Sea disputes. There is significant literature 
that focuses on this topic. Some focus on Chinese decision-making to expand into the South 
China Sea while others choose to emphasize the implications of the South China Sea 
disputes for UNCLOS. This section will review the differing explanations of South China 
Sea disputes. 
1. Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-Making and the South China Sea  
Several authors focus on the role of Xi Jinping as the source of China’s 
assertiveness. In his influential chapter, Heginbotham states that since 2009 China has 
become more assertive in the South China Sea especially since the accession of President 
 
3 Lingqun Li, China’s Policy towards the South China Sea When Geopolitics Meets the Law of the 
Sea, Contemporary Issues in the South China Sea (London: Routledge, 2018), 182, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315158709. 
3 
Xi Jinping.4 In addition, he argues that China’s decision to expand into the South China 
Sea has been based on China’s four core interests which are: maintaining diplomatic 
relations with its neighbors, pursuing its own economic interests, defending its national 
sovereignty and protecting what it sees as its sea lines of communications (SLOCS).5 Nie 
also claims that Xi Jinping has been one of the most influential decision makers for 
prioritizing diplomatic and economic relations with members of ASEAN, as well as 
promoting China’s one belt, one road initiative (OBOR) in order to enhance his own 
political performance in China.6  
Other authors highlight China’s growing assertiveness as the result of bureaucratic 
reforms within the Chinese Communist Party.7 Yamaguchi asserts that since 2009 Chinese 
maritime territorial disputes have become a top agenda item for discussion within the 
Central Politburo.8 As a result, the CCP has encouraged greater cooperation and 
consolidation between China’s political institutions.9 For example, the Chinese 
government announced during the National People’s Congress meeting in March of 2013 
that China’s maritime law enforcement agencies would be combined under one maritime 
law enforcement agency, the Chinese Coast Guard to consolidate and improve coordination 
in enforcing China’s national sovereignty maritime claims.10 Similarly, Chubb suggests 
that Xi Jinping’s personal role in Chinese decision-making is often overstated, and argues 
that Xi’s role has actually been more limited and acting as more of a gatekeeper in allowing 
China to expand into the South China Sea.11  
 
4 Eric Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia” in China Steps out: Beijing’s Major Power 
Engagement with the Developing World, ed. Joshua Eisenman (New York: London: Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2018), 50. 
5 Heginbotham, 50–51. 
6 Nie Wenjuan, “Xi Jinping’s Foreign Policy Dilemma: One Belt, One Road or the South China Sea?,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 3 (December 2016): 439, https://doi.org/10.1355/cs38-3c. 
7 Shinji Yamaguchi, “Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea,” China 
Perspectives, no. 3 (September 2016): 23, ProQuest. 
8 Yamaguchi, 25. 
9 Yamaguchi, 25. 
10 Yamaguchi, 26. 
11 Andrew Chubb, “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Policy,” Brookings (blog), January 22, 2019, 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/xi-jinping-and-chinas-maritime-policy/. 
4 
Historically, China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea can be traced to 
2006, after China began dispatching its maritime law enforcement ships to expand and 
consolidate its control over its disputed maritime territory claims.12 Between 2006 and 
2012, China continued its assertive actions in the South China Sea by maintaining a large 
presence of maritime patrols within its nine-dash line, using both its maritime law 
enforcement ships and Chinese armed maritime militia to enforce its claims.13 
Additionally, China was able to successfully obtain control of the Scarborough Shoal 
through the use of its coast guard vessels and maritime militia ships to coerce the 
Philippines’ coast guard ships to withdraw, leaving China in de facto control of 
Scarborough Shoal.14 China has also heightened its assertiveness through extensive land 
reclamation within the South China Sea. In 2014, China further heightened its 
aggressiveness in the South China Sea by beginning land reclamation operations around 
Johnson Reef and Hughes Reef resulting in the creation of artificial islands.15 Upon 
completion, many of the artificial islands have been militarized with surface–to–air 
missiles, anti-ship missiles and military surveillance systems.16 China has also obstructed 
Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea from conducting natural resource 
exploration by using its maritime enforcement vessels and Chinese maritime militia 
vessels.17 For instance, China has utilized its maritime enforcement and maritime militia 
to harass other countries oil rigs from conducting hydrocarbon surveys as well as 
preventing them from conducting oil drilling operations in their respective EEZs.18 
 
12 Chubb. 
13 Li, China’s Policy towards the South China Sea, 129. 
14 Michael Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray 
Zone Deterrence (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017), 99. https://csis-
website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170505_GreenM_CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.pdf. 
15 Zhou Fangyin, “Between Assertiveness and Self‐restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea 
Policy,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2016): 887, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12657. 
16 Nguyen Thanh Trung, “Vietnam’s Uphill Battle in the South China Sea: A Need for More 





2. South China Sea Disputes have Implications for UNCLOS 
Another large body of literature discussing South China Sea disputes focusses on 
the implications of UNCLOS. Nong Hong explains that many of the conflicting claims of 
Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei 
as well as China revolve around the core issue of island claims.19 Islands under the 
definition of UNCLOS Article 121 are “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by 
water, which is above water at high tide that is capable of human habitation.”20 Hong 
focuses on island claims involving sovereignty of the Spratly islands because it is argued 
as the most complicated matter within the South China Sea, due to the number of 
overlapping maritime claims.21 Zou adds that since China’s U-shaped line was actually 
proclaimed prior to the creation of UNCLOS, China’s historic rights to the South China 
Sea may actually have some historical basis.22 Zou claims that because China sees its 
historic rights to the South China Sea under threat and intrusion by other claimants, China 
has resorted to increasing its maritime patrols within the region.23 Ultimately, Zou asserts 
that until maritime delimitations are resolved between countries in the region, China will 
continue to defend what it sees as its rightful maritime claims in the South China Sea.24 
Therefore, it can be further argued that due to China’s historical maritime claims predating 
the establishment of western international maritime law, China views its national 
sovereignty and future economic prosperity in the region under threat by other regional 
claimants, which in turn drives China to continue to take assertive measures such as 
building artificial islands, obstructing other countries natural resource exploration and 
preventing non-Chinese from fishing in SCS waters. Additionally, while these scholars do 
 
19 Nong Hong, UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement: Law and Politics in the South China Sea 
(London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), chap.3, 42, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203111215. 
20 “Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” United Nations, accessed 
February 15, 2021, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm. 
21 Hong, UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement, 55. 
22 Keyuan Zou, “China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited,” Ocean Development & 
International Law 43, no. 1 (January 2012): 28, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2012.647483. 
23 Zou, 20. 
24 Zou, 29. 
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provide alternative views of how China views its own maritime claims, there is rather little 
literature about how regional countries have responded to China’s assertiveness of 
maritime claims in the South China Sea. 
3. Regional Responses to China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea 
Relatively little literature has been devoted to explaining why some Southeast 
Asian countries are more or less successful in responding to Chinese assertiveness in the 
South China Sea. The Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012 could be seen as a less 
confrontational response to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Such a response 
against China’s assertiveness would be seeking a compromise with China through either 
the issuance of diplomatic statements, protests, seeking legal arbitration or appeasing China 
by agreeing to joint economic investment in the South China Sea. Initially, the Philippines 
responded aggressively by deploying its naval frigate to arrest several Chinese fishermen 
illegally fishing on Scarborough Shoal, resulting in China dispatching its own maritime 
enforcement vessels.25 However, the Philippines ultimately decided to pursue a more less 
confrontational response by withdrawing its vessels from Scarborough Shoal and by 
pursuing legal arbitration against China.26 Moreover, this resulted in an unsuccessful 
outcome for the Philippines because they eventually ceded administrative control of the 
Shoal to China.27 The previous Vanguard Bank incident in 2019 involving a Chinese state-
owned enterprise (SOE) survey vessel and maritime enforcement vessels as well as 
Vietnam’s maritime enforcement vessels could best be described as an accommodating 
response.28 An accommodating response would be essentially ignoring or observing 
China’s survey operations or maritime enforcement patrols within a country’s own EEZ. 
Currently, Vietnam’s decision to pursue a more accommodating response has led to a 
moderately successful outcome because Vietnam has been unable to persuade China’s 
maritime forces or SOE oil exploration vessel to leave its EEZ. The China-Vietnam oil rig 
 
25 Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 101. 
26 Green et al., 105. 
27 Green et al., 99. 
28 Trung, “Vietnam’s Uphill Battle in the South China Sea.” 
7 
incident in 2014 involved the Chinese SOE oil rig Haiyang Shi You (HYSY) 981 
deployment within Vietnam’s EEZ. In response, Vietnam aggressively deployed its own 
maritime law enforcement vessels to compel China to leave its EEZ leading to an escalation 
of tensions..29 Vietnam’s response can be seen as aggressive due to the employment of 
numerous maritime law enforcement and fishing vessels against China’s oil rig for 
violating Vietnam’s EEZ..30 Additionally, the China-Vietnam oil rig incident can also be 
viewed as a successful outcome against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea 
because Vietnam was able to compel China to withdrawal its maritime forces and its SOE 
oil exploration vessel from Vietnam’s EEZ.31 
Michael Green and his coauthors, in their report on Countering Coercion in 
Maritime Asia, do discuss several incidents involving China’s assertiveness in the South 
China Sea as well as regional countries’ responses. But their analysis focuses more on the 
role of the United States. One weakness in his work is that Green and his colleagues do not 
determine whether Southeast Asian countries’ responses to China’s assertiveness were 
successful or unsuccessful. This report presents several detailed case studies. The South 
China Sea case involving the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, the Second Thomas 
Shoal incident in 2013 and the China-Vietnam oil rig incident in 2014. In both the 
Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas shoal incidents, Green et al. consistently find that 
if the United States had become involved earlier in the dispute, it could have significantly 
de-escalated the situation.32 However, by focusing solely on the role of the United States 
involvement, Green et al. overlook a critical factor of whether external balancing with the 
United States does lead to more successful responses with Chinese assertiveness in the 
South China Sea. Green et al. also suggest that during the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig 
incident, Vietnam was able to successfully drive China out of its EEZ through the use of 
its maritime forces.33 Yet Green underscores the importance of how Vietnam was able to 
 
29 Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 202. 
30 Green et al., 208. 
31 Green et al., 202. 
32 Green et al., 200. 
33 Green et al., 223. 
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successfully achieve this. Moreover, from preliminary analysis of his case study it appears 
to be the result of Vietnam’s internal balancing by possibly investing more into its maritime 
law enforcement and naval capabilities to employ in a potential conflict with China. 
Additionally, Green overlooks another critical feature of whether Vietnam’s aggressive 
response toward China during the 2014 oil rig incident could be applicable to other 
countries and possibly applied in the future against Chinese military coercion. 
Other analysts have also looked at regional players’ responses to China’s 
provocations. Derek Grossman suggests that since the China-Vietnam oil rig incident in 
2014, Vietnam has indeed significantly increased its defense funding by purchasing more 
defense capabilities.34 In fact, since the China-Vietnam oil rig incident, Vietnam has 
completed several weapons deals with Russia acquiring 36 SU-30 multi-strike aircrafts as 
well as installing several Russian shore-based anti-ballistic missile systems to deter future 
Chinese assertiveness.35 However, while Vietnam’s land and air defense capabilities have 
grown the country still possesses relatively weak maritime defense capabilities and 
inadequate maritime domain awareness.36 Similarly, the Philippines has also agreed on 
several future military technology transfer deals and defense infrastructure upgrades with 
the U.S. to further modernize its capabilities against China’s assertiveness in the South 
China Sea.37  
Nguyen Thanh Trung adds that, since the China-Vietnam oil rig incident in 2014, 
Vietnam has increased its maritime defense capabilities against Chinese assertiveness 
within the region.38 Trung also poses the question of whether other South China Sea 
claimants should attempt to initiate legal arbitration against China similar to the Philippines 
 
34 Derek Grossman, “Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?,” Asia 
Policy 13, no. 1 (January 2018): 117, Project Muse. 
35 Grossman, “Can Vietnam’s Military Stand Up to China in the South China Sea?,” 119. 
36 Grossman, 124. 
37 Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can 
Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 107, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294. 
38 Trung, “Vietnam’s Uphill Battle in the South China Sea.” 
9 
international arbitration case in 2016.39 However, Trung responds stating that it will likely 
have little effect in persuading China to change its behavior in the South China Sea due to 
China’s reaction to the 2016 decision.40 Trung’s response highlights an important question, 
does stronger diplomatic support from the international community lead to a more 
successful outcome with China?41 In a more recent article by Grossman, Grossman also 
concurs with Trung’s approach, but adds that Vietnam’s lack of military alliances may 
force Vietnam to become more accustomed to China’s growing economic coercion in the 
South China Sea.42 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Although there may be other potential factors or reasons for explaining why some 
Southeast Asian responses to Chinese actions in the South China Sea have been more 
successful than others, this study will be considering activity across the countries’ policy 
decisions, in order to ascertain what conditions result in successful or unsuccessful 
responses to China’s actions in the region. After a thorough qualitative examination is 
conducted on each case study, a more logical determination of which hypothesis serves as 
the best explanatory reason should emerge. However, after initial analysis of South China 
Sea and regional response literature, the following hypotheses have been identified. 
H1: Increased External Balancing with the United States leads to more successful 
outcomes. If this hypothesis is valid, empirical evidence should suggest that increased 
diplomatic involvement of prominent U.S. officials, conducting of joint military exercises 
and official diplomatic defense agreements should lead to more successful outcomes by 
convincing China to reduce its assertiveness in the region for the potential benefits of oil 





42 Derek Grossman, “Why Vanguard Bank and Why Now? Explaining Chinese Behavior in the South 
China Sea,” (blog) August 19, 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/08/why-vanguard-bank-and-why-
now-explaining-chinese-behavior.html. 
10 
external balancing should result in more unsuccessful outcomes with China’s assertiveness 
in the region. 
H2: Increased Internal Balancing leads to more successful outcomes. If this 
hypothesis is true, empirical evidence should indicate that the redistribution of military 
funds across countries military branches toward more maritime defense capabilities such 
as coast guards and maritime law enforcement agencies, causes China to reevaluate its 
approach in seeking access to each of the country’s economic exclusive zone or territorial 
sea natural resources. In addition, there should be clear indications of increasing maritime 
defense funding, acquiring of maritime defense assets from another country, or an increase 
of production of maritime defense assets within each country coinciding with more 
successful outcomes with China. 
H3: Increased coercive diplomacy against China’s assertiveness leads to more 
successful outcomes. If this hypothesis is valid, empirical evidence should demonstrate that 
a more aggressive military response has contributed to a more successful outcome with 
China regarding claims to natural resources within each country’s maritime EEZ or 
territorial sea. Due to multiple incidents involving competing military forces with China 
within the region, there should be a clear depiction of each country utilizing higher or lower 
levels of its military, coast guard, or fishing vessels corresponding to a more or less 
successful outcome with Chinese assertiveness. 
H4: Stronger Diplomatic support from the International Community leads to more 
successful outcomes: If this hypothesis is valid, empirical evidence should indicate that 
when countries utilize state and international media involvement, diplomatic protests, 
diplomatic statements, the international community begins to support the country leading 
to a more successful outcome against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this research is to explain why some regional country responses 
succeed while others fail against Chinese territorial aggression within the South China Sea. 
This research will be examining countries’ policy choices and how they affect the level of 
success or failure of their responses to China’s assertiveness. The research objective is 
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primarily to determine which set of particular factors have led to more successful responses 
to China’s maritime law enforcement and maritime militia vessels over conflicting 
territorial claims in the South China Sea. 
1. Research Method 
This project will assess the four hypotheses by examining various countries’ policy 
decisions using three sets of case studies: 1) Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, 
and Vietnam oil rig incidents during the years of 2012–2014; 2) the Vanguard Bank 
incident involving Vietnam and China in 2019; and 3) the West Capella incident involving 
Malaysia, Vietnam and China from 2019 to present. I have chosen these previous case 
studies because they are representative evidence of actual Chinese assertiveness in the 
South China Sea. I collected and analyzed several different case studies from each of these 
incidents to determine under what conditions Southeast Asian countries have been able to 
achieve their goals in their region. After review of the above incidents, a final assessment 
of the findings will be presented that identifies the strongest causal relationship that leads 
to successful responses by Southeast Asian countries toward China’s territorial aggression 
within the South China Sea. 
Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Vietnam Oil rig incident (2012–2014). 
Initially, this research was concentrated on accumulating empirical evidence on each of 
these three case studies in order to present evidence that can be used to test each of the 
hypotheses. Research completed attempted to identify conditions that make responses to 
Chinese aggression more successful and what conditions or factors make responses less 
successful. Ultimately, the goal of this first stage of research was to determine whether 
these identified conditions of successful responses, are also present in more recent incidents 
of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
The Vanguard Bank incident in 2019. During this section, the research presents 
evidence of a more recent case between Vietnam and China in 2019, in order to test each 
of the hypotheses. The research concentrated on whether the Vanguard Bank incident in 
2019, possesses the same or differing conditions that were previously found in the 
historical cases. This research also conducted careful consideration of identifying any new 
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explanations that could also be contributing factor(s) in successful or unsuccessful 
responses with China in the South China Sea. 
The West Capella Incident in 2019 to Present. After review of the subsequent case 
studies, the research will then turn to analyze another more recent incident the West 
Capella, involving the Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, Vietnam, and China from 
2019 until present, in order to test each of the four hypotheses. 
After an analytical review of all of the above case studies, each of the cases will be 
analyzed through the lens of each of the four proposed hypotheses. Ultimately, one of the 
four hypotheses will provide the best causal explanation of a more successful or 
unsuccessful response to the Chinese Coast Guard or maritime militia over territorial 
claims in the South China Sea. 
2. Sources and Application  
A variety of sources are available to support this foregoing research. Michael 
Green’s Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia provides important historical data that can 
be used going forward in more recent cases of China’s assertiveness in the South China 
Sea. Moreover, published books and academic articles regarding potential responses to 
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, will make up a majority of sources. In 
addition, regional newspapers, media excerpts and official diplomatic statements from 
Southeast Asian countries officials will also be utilized to provide a more internal regional 
perspective to the supplied evidence in this research. Reports from think tanks such as the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS) and S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS) will also be utilized to provide essential case studies on 
Vietnam’s ongoing incident with China near Vanguard Bank, as well as the West Capella 
incident to provide an important baseline of building more empirically related evidence for 
each of the proposed hypotheses. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis will begin with the clearly identified research question as well as the 
significance of the question, then provide the relevant empirical historical case studies and 
13 
evaluate conditions found in each of the historical case studies. Chapter II will provide an 
explanation of the earlier cases as well as the Vanguard Bank incident in 2019, by 
presenting appropriate empirical evidence and analysis through the use of each of the 
hypotheses identified to determine if any are appropriate for explaining a potential 
successful or unsuccessful explanation of the incident. 
The third chapter will examine another incident involving Malaysia, Vietnam and 
China, the West Capella incident. Using the previously identified hypotheses along with 
case study analysis, this research will again determine if any of the identified hypotheses 
are applicable to the formulation of a potential successful or unsuccessful explanation for 
this incident. Finally, the thesis will also include a summary and findings section, to 
provide an overview of the previous cases and determine which hypothesis provides the 
best causal explanation for successful responses with China in the South China Sea. 
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II. VIETNAM’S RESPONSES TO CHINA (2014–2019) 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why Vietnam’s responses to China’s 
incursions have been less successful since the previous 2014 oil rig incident. This chapter 
will examine the history directly following the 2014 oil rig incident to provide a 
chronological overview of how Vietnam responded to China’s assertiveness in the South 
China Sea. We will first discuss Vietnam and China’s reaffirmed partnership directly 
following the oil rig crisis, as well as how Vietnam responded domestically by enhancing 
its own maritime capabilities through limited internal balancing. Then, we will discuss how 
Vietnam has continued to enhance its defense capabilities against China’s assertiveness 
through its use of external balancing with its strategic partners to include Russia, India, 
Japan, and the United States. Yet, despite Vietnam’s reaffirmed partnership with China, 
use of limited internal balancing and external balancing with other countries, Vietnam’s 
responses to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea have remained less successful, 
because Vietnam has been unable to coerce China to withdraw from its EEZ and complete 
uninterrupted oil exploration. We will also examine the most recent incident at Vanguard 
Bank in 2019 and explain why this recent incident’s outcome was also less successful for 
Vietnam. I will then conclude this chapter with a summary of my hypotheses found during 
research. 
A. VIETNAM AND CHINA’S RAPPROCHEMENT 
Directly following the 2014 oil rig incident, on August 26, 2014, Vietnam sent its 
special envoy Le Hong Ang to China to meet with Chinese leaders to repair bilateral 
relations between the two countries.43 After a series of diplomatic meetings, by October of 
2014 both China and Vietnam agreed to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) and also 
established a hotline between each country to prevent maritime miscalculations from 
happening again in the South China Sea.44 In December of 2014, China also sent Yu 
 
43 Tran Truong Thuy, “Tightrope Walking over the Sea of Trouble: Vietnam’s Foreign Policy, 
Maritime Strategy, and Relations with China and the United States,” in China, The United States, and the 
Future of Southeast Asia, ed. David Denoon (New York: NYU Press, 2017), 171. 
44 Thuy, “Tightrope Walking over the Sea of Trouble,” 172. 
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Zhengsheng, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, to Hanoi for three days to solidify China-Vietnam relations after 
overcoming the oil rig crisis.45 In addition, both countries reaffirmed they would abide to 
their 16-word guideline, which was a 1999 agreement between both communist 
governments confirming that each country would strive to maintain benign intentions 
toward one another during a dispute, in order to maintain a positive relationship between 
both countries.46 On June 29, 2015, Vietnam further pledged its cooperative support for 
China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiative due to the need for better 
foreign direct investment within Vietnam.47 Vietnam’s cooperation can be explained by 
its foreign policy framework approach of “cooperation and struggle” with China, in which 
Vietnam is struggling against China’s expansionist maritime goals, while also seeking 
cooperation with China economically as well as any other interests that converge with 
Vietnam’s.48 Despite Vietnam’s closer diplomatic and economic ties with China after the 
2014 incident, Vietnam’s domestic economy while reliant on trade with China is the least 
susceptible to China’s economic coercion methods that are typically employed against 
other countries within Asia.49 For example, Vietnam does not rely on bilateral aid from 
China to sustain its economic development.50 It currently only relies on a few countries in 
order to sustain its foreign loan indebtedness.51 However, it is important to note that 
Vietnam is vulnerable to particular types of Chinese economic coercion methods. One 
 
45 “VN, China Need to Treasure Bilateral Ties,” Vietnam Government Portal News, December 26, 
2014, http://news.chinhphu.vn/Home/VN-China-need-to-treasure-bilateral-ties/201412/23405.vgp. 
46 Christina Lai, “A Coercive Brotherhood: Sino-Vietnamese Relations from the 1990s to 2018,” The 
Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 123 (May 2020): 481, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645484. 
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economic coercion method China employs against Vietnam is the disruption of Vietnam’s 
joint oil exploration activities with international oil companies. In turn, this adversely 
affects Vietnam’s ability to continue its own domestic energy production, especially in the 
future. Another method China employs against Vietnam during a maritime dispute is the 
reduction of Chinese tourism to Vietnam, which can severely impact Vietnam’s domestic 
economy. For example, during the 2014 oil rig crisis China cancelled several flights and 
hotel reservations to Vietnam amid the growing domestic unrest in the country, which 
resulted in an economic loss of $1.8 million for Vietnam during the standoff.52 
B. VIETNAM’S DOMESTIC DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT 
China’s use of its own coast guard assets during the China-Vietnam oil rig incident 
in 2014 inspired Vietnam to similarly construct its own white-hulled vessels to employ a 
comparable maritime strategy against China, by expanding its own maritime enforcement 
vessel fleet to protect its rightful territorial claims within the South China Sea.53 In order 
to accomplish this maritime strategy, Vietnam has increased its internal balancing within 
the country in several ways. Vietnam has substantially increased its military spending and 
has shifted its financial resources toward more maritime defense capabilities (Figure 1 
depicts Vietnam’s Military Expenditure from 2014 to 2018, as a percentage of GDP). 
 
52 Thuy, “Tightrope Walking over the Sea of Trouble,” 168. 
53 Nguyen Thanh Trung and Truong-Minh Vu, “The 2014 Oil Rig Crisis and its Implications for 
Vietnam-China Relations,” in Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Under Doi Moi, ed. Le Hong Hiep and Anton 
Tsvetov (Maryland: Project Muse, 2018), 88. 
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Figure 1. Vietnam Military Expenditure 2014–2018, actual amounts and as 
percentage of GDP.54 
In fact, in 2016 Vietnam reallocated over $1.6 billion in its defense funding from 
its ground forces to its maritime forces for development.55 In addition to increases in 
maritime defense funding, Vietnam has also reformed the administrative responsibilities 
of its coast guard. In November 2018, Vietnam passed the 2018 Coast Guard Law, which 
officially clarified the responsibilities of the Vietnamese Coast Guard.56 The 2018 Coast 
Guard Law states that one of Vietnam’s main designated responsibilities is protecting 
Vietnam’s maritime territorial sovereignty.57 The 2018 Coast Guard Law also provides the 
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Vietnamese Coast Guard with greater flexibility while operating along Vietnam’s long 
coastlines and authorizes coast guard personnel to conduct warning shots to deter other 
countries’ ships from illegally operating within Vietnam’s waters.58 
Vietnam’s focus on the domestic production of maritime defense assets has also 
furthered its internal balancing and supplemented its own maritime strategy within the 
South China Sea. Although Vietnam is under considerable budget constraints in 
performing research for domestic defense technologies, it has still made substantial 
progress in domestic shipbuilding of both coast guard and naval vessels.59 Indeed, the 
country has completed the building of four 2,000-ton offshore coast guard patrol vessels 
and is undergoing construction of their first 4,000-ton offshore maritime patrol vessel.60 
In addition, in May of 2018 Vietnam held a keel-laying ceremony for the construction of 
its first submarine rescue vessel to assist not only with future submarine rescue operations 
for Vietnam’s Russian Kilo submarines but to also assist in oil survey operations for 
resource exploitation within its own EEZ.61 However, it is important to note that while 
Vietnam has increased internal balancing, its domestic defense production is negligible in 
comparison to China’s own domestic defense research and development. Thus, Vietnam 
must also rely on external balancing with its strategic partners in order to reduce its 
asymmetrical defense position vis-à-vis China. 
C. VIETNAM’S STRATEGIC PARTNERS AND MILITARY PURCHASES 
Due to its limited investment in domestic technologies for defense, Vietnam is still 
heavily reliant on defense equipment, training, and technologies from its strategic partners 
such as Russia, India, Japan, and the United States.62 Russia has been Vietnam’s primary 
defense equipment provider for the past several decades and has been utilized to 
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supplement Vietnam’s internal balancing deficiencies within the country.63 In fact, since 
the China-Vietnam oil rig incident in 2014, Vietnam has completed its purchase of all six 
Kilo class submarines, six missile corvettes, as well as two gunboats from Russia.64 In 
addition, Vietnam has nearly completed negotiations with Russia to obtain Russia’s S-400 
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system, which would provide Vietnam with greater air 
defense capabilities against increasing Chinese maritime aircraft patrols in the South China 
Sea.65 Russia and India have also come to an agreement to export their jointly developed 
BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system to Vietnam, which would greatly enhance 
Vietnam’s Navy against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.66 However, 
Vietnam, Russia, and India have yet to finalize this defense agreement, due to delayed 
financial negotiations caused by the coronavirus pandemic and because of Vietnam’s 
limited defense budget.67 
Vietnam and India have also completed several defense agreements. In October of 
2014, Vietnam and India completed the purchase for four coastal patrol vessels to 
supplement Vietnam’s coast guard as well as an agreement to further enhance joint coast 
guard cooperation efforts in the future.68 Additionally, in May of 2015 Vietnam and India 
also signed a joint vision statement that further increased defense cooperation, by allowing 
for annual security dialogues, military service exchanges, and professional military 
training.69 In fact, since the joint vision statement, Vietnam has received Kilo submarine 
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training from India as well as pilot safety training for its Su-27 Flanker and Su-30 fighter 
aircraft.70 Ultimately, Vietnam and India’s extensive defense agreements led both 
countries to elevate their strategic ties cooperation in 2016 to a strategic partnership.71 
Vietnam has also furthered its external balancing with Japan with the receipt of 
several maritime patrol vessels. For instance, in August of 2014, in response to the 2014 
oil rig incident, Japan announced it would assist Vietnam with its maritime enforcement 
patrols by donating six used patrol boats that Vietnam could use in future maritime patrols 
within the South China Sea.72 Additionally, in October of 2014, Japan considered 
delivering several new maritime patrol vessels to the Vietnamese Coast Guard.73 In 
February of 2016, Vietnam and Japan completed an agreement to allow Japan’s Maritime 
Self Defense Force (MSDF) P-3 Orions to refuel at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh air base.74 
Vietnam and Japan have also agreed on a military intelligence sharing pact, which could 
allow for further defense exchanges of classified military information between both 
countries’ militaries in the future.75 
Vietnam and the United States have also pledged to enhance defense cooperation 
in the future. However, with the exception of the U.S. lifting of the arms embargo in 2016, 
announcement of a comprehensive partnership in 2017, followed by the delivery of a U.S. 
Coast Guard cutter vessel and six Metal Shark patrol boats to the Vietnamese Coast Guard 
in May of 2017, there have not been significant defense agreements or defense cooperation 
between the two countries.76 Thus, Vietnam does not exclusively externally balance with 
any one country, instead since the 2014 oil rig incident Vietnam has chosen to continually 
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expand its defense partnerships with a select group of strategic partners to include Russia, 
India, and Japan. However, Vietnam does limit its defense cooperation with the United 
States, in order to avoid violating its own three no’s policy of “not joining military 
alliances, not allowing foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil, and not allowing a 
foreign country to use Vietnamese soil to carry out military activities against other 
countries.”77 
D. THE VANGUARD BANK INCIDENT 
The Vanguard Bank incident is an ongoing oil exploration dispute between 
Vietnam and China. Its origins can be traced to China’s initial 1992 lease agreement with 
the Crestone Energy company to conduct exploration in blocks near Vanguard Bank.78 
Since the signing of that lease agreement, China and Vietnam have routinely disagreed on 
who has legitimate rights to conduct oil exploration within the area.79 The U.S. Energy 
Information Administration estimates that the area around Vanguard Bank may contain up 
to 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves.80 In June of 
2017, Vietnam decided to pursue a joint oil exploration agreement with Repsol, a global 
energy oil exploration company based in Spain, and the UAE Mubadala development 
company to begin oil exploration in one of Vietnam’s southern oil blocks, located near 
Vanguard Bank.81 In response, China demanded Vietnam inform Repsol to cease all oil 
exploration activities within the exploratory block.82 However, according to diplomatic 
sources in Hanoi, Vietnam refused China’s request and within weeks of the initial 
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agreement, China threatened the Vietnamese government that they would attack Vietnam’s 
bases within the Spratly Islands, if Vietnam did not comply.83 In July of 2017, Repsol was 
ordered to leave the drilling area by members of Vietnam’s state oil firm PetroVietnam.84 
The decision to suspend the oil project inflicted a total loss of $200 million on both Repsol 
and Mubadala due to initial development costs.85 Ultimately, the joint oil exploration 
project was cancelled forcing Vietnam to pay both Repsol and Mubadala a total of $1 
billion in compensation and early termination fees for the oil exploration block.86 In May 
of 2018, another petroleum company, Rosneft based in Russia, formally announced it 
would commence drilling wells in support of the Nam Con Son Basin project within 
Vietnam’s southern EEZ; Figure 2 depicts Vietnam’s Southern EEZ and Block 06–01.87 
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Figure 2. Vietnam’s Southern EEZ and Oil Exploration Block 06–01.88 
The Nam Con Son Basin project is a joint oil exploration project that will expand 
Vietnam’s ability to bring petroleum by pipeline from Vietnam’s EEZ for domestic use 
within Vietnam’s mainland cities.89 In response to Rosneft’s announcement, China’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lu Kang stated in May 2018 that “any nation seeking to 
conduct oil or gas exploration as well as exploitation within Chinese jurisdictional waters 
must obtain permission from the Chinese government prior to commencing operations.”90 
Despite China’s previous warning, on May 12, 2019, the Japanese Hakuryu-5 a semi-
submersible drilling rig jointly contracted by Vietnam and Russia, was given permission 
 
88 Adapted from Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “China Risks Flare-Up Over Malaysian, 
Vietnamese Gas Resources.” 
89 “Russian petroleum giant sets up $1bn joint venture in Vietnam,” Tuoi Tre News, October 21, 2015 
https://tuoitrenews.vn/business/31111/russian-petroleum-giant-sets-up-1bn-joint-venture-in-vietnam. 
90 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on May 17, 2018,” Foreign 
Ministry People’s Republic of China, May 17, 2018, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/fyrth/t1560357.htm. 
25 
by Vietnam to begin drilling operations at Vanguard Bank.91 As a result, China viewed 
Vietnam’s employment of the Hakuryu-5 oil rig as a violation of China’s nine-dash line 
claim within the South China Sea.92 In response to Vietnam’s commencement of oil rig 
operations, on June 16, 2019, China dispatched a series of its coast guard ships to 
aggressively harass and disrupt the Hakuryu-5 oil rig’s operations.93 For instance, on July 
2, 2019, the Chinese Coast Guard vessel 35111 maneuvered between the Hakuryu-5 oil rig 
at high speed passing within less than half of a nautical mile from the oil rig.94 Despite a 
significant distance from China’s mainland, each of the dispatched China coast guard 
vessels was able to maintain continuous presence near the rig by periodically rotating to 
resupply each coast guard vessel at China’s Fiery Cross Reef.95 
On July 3, 2019, China’s SOE oil survey vessel the Haiyang Dizhi 8 entered the 
southern portion of Vietnam’s EEZ in order to further disrupt Vietnam’s exploration 
activities, and conduct its own seismic oil surveys within the region.96 The Haiyang Dizhi 
8 was also under protective escort by one of China’s largest coast guard vessels, the Haijing 
3901 a 12,000-ton Chinese Coast Guard vessel as well as accompanied by another 2,200-
ton coast guard ship.97 In response to the Haiyang Dizhi 8 violation of Vietnam’s EEZ, 
Vietnam issued several diplomatic notes to China for them to withdraw the Haiyang Dizhi 
8 from Vietnam’s EEZ.98 However, China repeatedly ignored each of Vietnam’s formal 
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diplomatic requests to withdrawal its survey ship.99 Consequently, as a result of China 
disrupting Vietnam’s joint oil rig operations, Vietnam was forced to extend its drilling 
operations from July 30 to September 15, 2019.100 On October 23, 2019, the Haiyang 
Dizhi 8 departed Vietnam’s southern EEZ effectively ending the standoff.101 After the 
incident was over, Vietnamese Major General Hoang announced that over 50 Vietnamese 
and 40 Chinese vessels were involved during the 4-month standoff.102 However, in 
contrast to the previous China-Vietnam oil rig incident in 2014, Vietnamese vessels 
involved in this most recent incident only made minor attempts to force the Chinese oil 
survey ship out of their EEZ.103 
Similar to the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig crisis, the United States’ involvement 
during the Vanguard Bank incident was also relatively limited for several reasons. The first 
reason is that it appears that Vietnam was unwilling to reach out to the United States during 
the Vanguard Bank incident for fear of violating its domestic three no’s policy.104 Another 
reason is that Vietnam still views the United States with suspicion and believes that the 
United States may eventually become increasingly involved in Vietnam’s own domestic 
affairs and advocate for Vietnam to become a democracy.105 However, while the U.S. role 
was limited during the Vanguard Bank incident, the United States did issue several formal 
diplomatic announcements against China. For example, Morgan Ortagus a spokeswoman 
for the U.S. Department of State, released a statement asserting that “repeated provocative 
actions aimed at the offshore oil and gas development of other claimant states threaten 
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regional energy security and undermine the free and open Indo-Pacific energy market.”106 
Despite the United States’ diplomatic declarations, like the 2014 oil rig crisis, it did not 
directly physically intervene in the Vanguard Bank incident. In addition, while the United 
States and Vietnam share a comprehensive partnership, as well as participate in high level 
dialogues, it still appears that Vietnam imposes its own limitations to its level of military 
partnership with the United States.107 Moreover, this is also because Vietnam believes it 
risks angering China which is not only geographically closer to Vietnam but could easily 
inflict military coercion against Vietnam’s maritime forces at will.108 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF VIETNAM’S RESPONSE 
The Vanguard Bank incident could be interpreted as a successful outcome for 
Vietnam because they were still able to achieve their domestic goal of performing some 
joint oil exploration with both Russia and Japan. However, Vietnam was continuously 
disrupted by China’s incursions throughout its joint oil exploration, despite Vietnam’s 
recent increases in internal and external balancing. In addition, ultimately Vietnam was 
unable to coerce China to withdraw from its own EEZ, which rendered the incident overall 
only moderately successful. Moreover, despite the continued presence of Vietnam’s Coast 
Guard, coastal patrol, and fishing vessels, China’s Haiyang Dizhi 8 routinely refused to 
leave the southern EEZ, except to briefly refuel at Fiery Cross Reef, arriving a week later 
to continue its disruption of Vietnam’s joint oil operations.109 In the future Vietnam’s 
inability to coerce Chinese vessels to leave its EEZ could impact Vietnam’s domestic 
economy and its own ability to undertake joint exploration with other countries in order to 
sustain its growing domestic energy requirements. 
One potential explanation why Vietnam’s response was moderately successful at 
Vanguard Bank was because Vietnam was inconsistent in its initial response to China’s 
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assertiveness. Initially, Vietnam decided to aggressively deploy its Coast Guard and 
maritime enforcement vessels to confront China’s violation of Vietnam’s EEZ. However, 
after arrival Vietnam’s vessel shifted to a more accommodative response by simply 
observing the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and its escorts in the southern area of Vietnam’s EEZ.110 
If Vietnam had maintained a more aggressive approach with China by deploying more 
maritime enforcement vessels, it is possible they could have compelled China to withdraw 
from their EEZ similar to the China-oil rig incident in 2014. 
Another potential explanation for why Vietnam’s response was moderately 
successful at Vanguard Bank, is due to Vietnam’s unwillingness to overtly engage in 
external balancing against China. Indeed, Vietnam still views China as a strategic partner 
along with Russia and India both in diplomatic and economic cooperation.111 In addition, 
Vietnam’s government realizes that it must carefully consider its maritime responses when 
confronting China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, due to growing domestic anti-
Chinese sentiment in Vietnam and also between Vietnamese business elites who are still 
economically dependent on China.112 Thus, Vietnam must strategically consider its own 
domestic politics within the country when it chooses to externally balance with other 
countries, as well as when it contemplates a maritime response against China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea.113 
F. LOOKING FORWARD 
Since the Vanguard Bank incident in 2019, Vietnam has continued to expand its 
maritime defense capabilities in order to protect its national sovereignty from the consistent 
challenges by China in the South China Sea.114 In December 2019, Vietnam released its 
National Defense White Paper of 2019, which states that it will continue to seek external 
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partnerships with other nations that respect its sovereignty and have common interests.115 
Moreover, this could possibly be interpreted as evidence that Vietnam’s leaders no longer 
view closer military cooperation with other foreign countries as a violation of its three no’s 
policy. Vietnam’s 2020 defense funding has also remained focused on increasing maritime 
defense funding in the areas of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities such as anti-
ship ballistic missiles, frigates, and fast attack crafts (FAC).116 Unfortunately, Vietnam’s 
total defense expenditure is projected to remain at 2.4% of its GDP until 2024.117 Vietnam 
has also continued to place an emphasis on allocation of funding for its continued 
construction of domestic warships into the immediate future.118 However, Vietnam still 
spends heavily on maintaining its active duty personnel and aging Soviet purchased 
equipment.119 In the coming years, it will be essential for Vietnam to continue its 
development of domestic defense research technology as well as its domestic shipbuilding 
in order to gradually reduce its dependence on outdated defense technologies from other 
countries. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Since the 2014 oil rig incident, Vietnam has not pursued increased coercive 
diplomacy against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. In fact, no evidence was 
found during research that Vietnam has responded as aggressively to China as it did during 
the 2014 oil rig incident. Research suggests that Vietnam takes a more calculated approach 
when responding to China’s violations of its own EEZ by assessing its domestic politics 
and its relationship with China and other great powers. Research findings indicate that 
since 2014, Vietnam has increased its internal balancing significantly through the 
redistribution of its military funds from a land-focused military toward more maritime 
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defense capabilities due to the growing threat of China. Additionally, Vietnam has 
increased its own domestic ship-building capacities to counter China’s increasing threat. 
However, despite Vietnam’s use of increased internal balancing it has not yet resulted in 
more successful outcomes when facing China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
Vietnam’s growing economy and expanding trade with other trading partners such 
as the United States, Japan, and South Korea enable it to not be completely economically 
dependent on trade with China, which reduces its vulnerability to Chinese economic 
coercion. However, Vietnam’s resilient economy has also not led to successful outcomes 
with China in the South China Sea. Moreover, Vietnam has yet to concede or enter into a 
joint-oil exploration agreement with China, nor have they allowed China to conduct 
maritime patrols in their EEZ without contest. However, Vietnam’s unwillingness to 
concede to China’s demands has also proven to be very costly for Vietnam. Vietnam has 
lost several foreign partners and over $1 billion to China’s disruption of its recent joint-
exploration activities within Vietnam’s EEZ, resulting in an overall unsuccessful economic 
outcome for Vietnam. 
Research also demonstrates that Vietnam does not exclusively externally balance 
with the United States. Instead, Vietnam chooses to externally balance with several 
countries such as Russia, India, and Japan. In addition, on October 20, 2020, Vietnam and 
Japan signed a defense agreement to transfer military technologies between both countries 
in order to enhance defense cooperation going forward into the future.120 Moreover, it is 
likely that Vietnam will continue to further its defense partnerships with its strategic 
partners in order to maintain its access to more advanced defense technologies to ultimately 
counter China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
Limited evidence was found during research to support the hypothesis that stronger 
diplomatic support from the international community results in a more successful outcome. 
Vietnam chose to limit domestic media exposure during the Vanguard Bank incident in 
order to not internationalize the issue. However, Vietnam did threaten legal arbitration 
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against China after the Vanguard Bank incident, which has caused limited international 
community involvement. For example, Vietnam’s diplomatic statements at the most recent 
South China Sea conference in November of 2019, of intending to file a legal arbitration 
case against China, appears to have affected China’s coercive behavior.121 However, 
despite Vietnam’s recent legal threats at the SCS conference, Vietnam has yet to 
successfully persuade China from routinely violating Vietnam’s EEZ. 
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III. MALAYSIA’S RESPONSES TO CHINA (2013–2020)
Malaysia’s responses to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea have been 
ultimately less successful because they have been inconsistent and uncoordinated. 
Additionally, Malaysia’s failures may be compounded in the future due to its increased 
susceptibility to economic coercion and its closer diplomatic ties with China. This chapter 
will examine China’s incursions into Malaysia’s EEZ at Luconia Shoals, which will 
provide a historical background to Malaysia’s responses to China’s assertiveness in the 
South China Sea, as well as demonstrate existing political struggles within Malaysia that 
have contributed to Malaysia’s inconsistent responses. Then, it will discuss how 
Malaysia’s declining defense budget and persistent land threats have resulted in limited 
internal and external balancing since these initial incidents, which provides necessary 
background on explaining Malaysia’s most recent response during the West Capella 
incident. This chapter will also demonstrate that Malaysia was overall unsuccessful in 
failing to force China to depart its EEZ for several years and made minimal efforts to 
increase their capabilities in the country. As a result, Malaysia may lose its ability to 
conduct oil exploration within its own EEZ and could be forced in the future to accept joint 
oil development projects with China. This chapter will conclude with a summary of my 
research findings. 
A. ORIGINS OF CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS AT LUCONIA SHOALS
The Luconia Shoals are located in Malaysia’s EEZ off the coast of Sarawak state
and have been a contested region for several years. Many of the Luconia Shoals are 
underwater at high tide, but they are still considered to be a part of Malaysia’s continental 
shelf according to the 1979 Malaysia New Map (see Figure 3 depicts a map of Luconia 
Shoals).122 
122 Mohammad Ahmad and Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, “China’s Assertive Posture in Reinforcing 
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Figure 3. Map of Luconia Shoals.123 
The Luconia Shoals are known to possess several natural gas and oil reserves that 
Malaysia has utilized for its own domestic energy purposes for several years.124 In August 
of 2013, China began increasing its presence in the Luconia Shoals by completing several 
maritime patrols, culminating in a Chinese Coast guard vessel the Haijing 1123 dropping 
its anchor within the Luconia Shoals and maintaining its presence until November 2015.125 
However, despite China’s assertiveness within the Luconia Shoals many responses from 
Malaysia’s Najib administration were weak in responding to China’s assertiveness in the 
South China Sea. For instance, Malaysia allowed Chinese Coast Guard ships to remain in 
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its EEZ for a duration of time without military opposition but at the same time it issued 
diplomatic statements against China.126 Moreover, during the extended standoff in October 
2013 the Malaysian government also elevated its bilateral ties with China to a strategic 
partnership.127 In January of 2014, the Najib Ministry of Defense’s Royal Malaysia Navy 
Chief Admiral Jaafar routinely denied foreign media reports that China was consistently 
violating Malaysia’s EEZ in the Luconia Shoals, arguing that the presence of Chinese ships 
was due to China’s adjacent military exercises within the area.128 Similarly, Malaysia has 
also taken a limited diplomatic stance on the South China Sea disputes. At the Shangri-La 
dialogue of May of 2015, Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein warned countries that 
the South China Sea disputes could become a potentially deadly conflict.129 However in 
June of 2015, Shahidan Kassim, the National Security Minister in Najib’s administration, 
posted aerial photographs of China’s Coast Guard vessels violating Malaysia’s EEZ on his 
Facebook social media profile; in order to internationalize the ongoing incident.130 Yet in 
November of 2015, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meeting, Malaysia 
had resumed a more non-confrontational stance, when Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib 
publicly stated that Malaysian and Chinese relations were at their highest levels.131 Each 
of these contrasting views from Malaysian government officials suggests that Malaysia 
was not able to present a coordinated response to China’s assertiveness in the South China 
Sea.132 Instead, several different Malaysian leaders issued uncoordinated responses that 
highlighted differing positions in relation to the South China Sea conflict. Moreover, these 
incidents can serve as initial evidence that the Malaysian government has adopted a limited 
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bandwagoning approach when responding to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, 
in which it attempts to preserve its economic gains from friendly China-Malaysian 
relations, yet also seeks to preserve its own territorial sovereignty from Chinese 
incursions.133 
The most significant violation of Malaysia’s EEZ at the Luconia Shoals occurred 
on March 25, 2016, in which over 100 Chinese fishing vessels and a Chinese Coast Guard 
vessel  trespassed within Malaysia’s EEZ.134 In response, Shahidan Kassim publicly stated 
that the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) had sent its coastal law 
enforcement vessels to investigate the area.135 However, following Kassim’s statements 
both the MMEA and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) forces senior officials later issued 
claims arguing that no Chinese ships had been located within the EEZ, resulting in an 
overall inconsistent diplomatic response.136 China’s foreign minister spokesman Hong Lei 
responded to Malaysia’s public statements, claiming that it was fishing season for China 
and that Chinese fishing trawlers were carrying out normal fishing activities within the 
South China Sea.137 Following China’s Foreign Ministry comments, Malaysia displayed 
a more assertive diplomatic stance by summoning China’s Ambassador Huang Huikang, 
to seek clarification of China’s EEZ violations and to officially register a diplomatic 
complaint about the incident.138 However, despite making various assertive diplomatic 
statements, Malaysia continued its limited bandwagoning approach by downplaying 
China’s previous EEZ violations in favor of stronger economic ties, just as it had done in 
response to the first Luconia Shoals incident in 2013. In fact, in November of 2016, Prime 
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Minister Najib met with Chinese President Xi Jinping to finalize 14 joint financial 
agreements worth $34 billion.139 
Malaysia’s responses have been traditionally non-confrontational toward China, 
yet occasionally Malaysia appears to have taken a more assertive diplomatic stance toward 
China’s maritime claims by issuing diplomatic statements against China’s violations in 
Malaysia’s EEZ. Malaysia’s inconsistent responses to China’s assertiveness can be 
explained in several different ways. One reason is that the Najib administration faced 
ongoing domestic political struggles within the country. In fact, the main political struggle 
within the Najib Administration was the need for money to bail out Malaysia’s 1 Malaysia 
Development Berhad (1MDB) state fund. In 2015, Najib was accused of stealing over $600 
million from Malaysia’s 1MDB state investment fund.140 In order to address this, in 2016 
Najib made several requests to Chinese state-owned companies to make direct payments 
to the 1MDB fund, to alleviate the state fund’s growing indebtedness.141 Thus, Najib’s 
averseness to challenge China’s violations in Malaysia’s EEZ, could be explained at least 
partly by his need to maintain a limited bandwagoning approach by maintaining a positive 
business relationship with China, yet also downplaying that China poses a threat to 
Malaysia’s maritime security. Another reason is that many business elites within Malaysia 
also have close economic ties to China’s mainland corporations, which makes an assertive 
approach to the Luconia Shoals incidents unfavorable to Malaysia’s business elites.142 
Moreover, Malaysia is heavily reliant on trade with China, both countries possess a strong 
trade relationship and continue to develop their economic ties.143 In fact, Malaysia’s 
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exports to China have increased from $2.4 billion in 1995 to $36.1 billion in 2018.144 In 
addition, ethnic Chinese business elites living within the country, generally prefer a 
friendlier approach in Malaysia-China relations.145 In turn, these domestic factors have 
severely limited the Najib administration’s foreign policy response toward China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea, due to the need for the administration to remain 
favorable within its political constituencies within the country by preserving Malaysia’s 
economic prosperity in order to maintain the ruling elite’s political legitimacy.146 
Malaysia has completed only limited internal balancing due to its limited defense 
budget and focus on persistent land-based threats. Malaysia’s limited defense budget is 
allocated primarily to its operational costs, instead of defense procurement costs. In fact, 
defense data collected from 2014 to 2018 reveals that Malaysia’s operational defense costs 
consume 77.5% of the annual budget, while its development expenditures account for only 
22.5%.147 In addition, since 2014, Malaysia’s defense budget has been in decline from 
$4.1 billion to $3.2 billion in 2019.148 Malaysia’s maritime developmental constraints can 
be illustrated by its inability to construct its new naval base in Sarawak.149 The purpose of 
the proposed naval base at Sarawak was to demonstrate to China that Malaysia was willing 
to protect its oil reserves against future China incursions at Luconia Shoals.150 However, 
the proposed naval base was unable to receive enough funding for development because of 
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Malaysia’s limited defense budget.151 In turn, Malaysia’s minimal defense funding for 
military development contributes to Malaysia’s inability to allocate sufficient funding to 
its own maritime asset and infrastructure development. 
However, it is important to note that Malaysia does display some evidence of 
limited internal balancing. For example, China’s incursions within Malaysia’s EEZ has 
driven Malaysia to increase its maritime patrols from 269 days in 2014 to 345 days in 2015 
around the Luconia Shoals since the initial 2013 incident, which places a growing demand 
on Malaysia’s aging fleet.152 Malaysia has also focused on increasing its maritime domain 
awareness by announcing its intention to acquire additional maritime patrol aircraft and 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the future.153 Moreover, this is due to Malaysia 
continuing to face land threats from Islamic militant groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
and Abu Sayyaf, as well as illegal border crossings from the Southern Philippines.154 The 
culmination of these factors has prevented Malaysia from shifting more of its defense 
funding toward more maritime capabilities in the South China Sea. Instead, Malaysia’s 
internal balancing has been limited, with a retained focus on land-based threats posed by 
transnational actors, this has resulted in much of its defense funding being devoted to the 
army and relatively little to developing its own maritime capabilities and supporting 
infrastructure. 
Malaysia’s reduced defense spending has also resulted in limited external balancing 
with other countries such as the United States, Japan, and India. During President Obama’s 
visit in April of 2014, Malaysia and the United States finally agreed to upgrade their 
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bilateral ties to a comprehensive partnership.155 Following the comprehensive partnership, 
Malaysia also allowed the installation of U.S. coastal surveillance radars within its Sabah 
State.156 In addition, Malaysia also offered to allow the U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon to fly 
from Malaysia’s Labuan island off the coast of Borneo, to assist in maritime cooperation 
surveillance efforts in the South China Sea.157 In February 2015 the U.S. agreed to deliver 
12 coastal patrol boats to Malaysia’s Eastern Sabah security command (ESSCOM) to 
further increase its coastal surveillance capabilities and provide Malaysia with early 
warning of potential land based threats.158 Malaysia has also reached defense agreements 
with Japan. In September of 2014, Malaysia allowed Japanese self-defense vessels to dock 
at Kota Kinabalu naval port for the first time since World War II.159 In addition, on May 
25, 2015, both Malaysia and Japan elevated each other’s ties to the level of strategic 
partnership.160 In July of 2017, Malaysia also received two Japanese Coast Guard cutters, 
a 1,700-ton Pekan and 1,500-ton Arau class, which became Malaysia’s largest Coast Guard 
cutter ships in its MMEA fleet.161 Malaysia has also externally balanced with India, 
through joint training mechanisms such as the SU-30 aircraft forum which provides 
training and maintenance guidance to Malaysia’s Air Forces.162 In addition, Malaysia and 
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India have also enhanced intelligence sharing, as well as agreeing to further joint exercises 
between the two countries.163  
At the same time, however, Malaysia has pursued closer defense cooperation with 
China, in which it has performed some military cooperation as well as completed a 
formalized defense agreement. One example of Malaysia’s military cooperation with 
China occurred in December of 2014, where both China and Malaysian armed forces held 
their first joint tabletop exercise in Malaysia’s Joint Warfare center.164 Another example 
occurred in September 2015, when China and Malaysia completed their first joint live fire 
exercise in the Straits of Malacca.165 Malaysia has also completed a defense agreement 
with China. In fact, in November 2016 at a financial agreement meeting, Malaysia and 
China signed a defense contract for the purchase of four Chinese littoral mission class ships 
for future use in maritime patrols.166 Malaysia has also demonstrated limited 
bandwagoning by allowing China to complete two port visits in 2017 with its PLA 
submarines at Malaysia’s northern naval base in Sabah.167 
Ultimately, Malaysia’s reduced external balancing and limited bandwagoning 
policy behavior with China can best be described as Malaysia hedging lightly between the 
U.S. and China. Moreover, this is due to rising great power competition between both the 
U.S. and China, and the fear of becoming entrapped in a potential great power conflict.168 
Malaysia’s light hedging strategy enables Malaysian ruling elites especially the BN 
political party, to consolidate their political power by improving the country’s economic 
prosperity by compromising with China.169 Moreover, Malaysian elites also address 
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external security concerns such as China’s previous EEZ violations by downplaying them 
as an insignificant security threat to the country.170 In turn, this allows Malaysia’s ruling 
elites to be perceived as a legitimate governing power in the eyes of the Malaysian 
population.171 Conversely, Malaysia has also expanded its limited defense cooperation and 
economic efforts in similar areas with the United States.172 Malaysia’s ability to lightly 
hedge between both great powers allowed its former ruling political party to acquire mutual 
economic and defense benefits from both of the great powers, without placing the country 
in a formally aligned position that could incur significant security or economic risks.173 
B. THE WEST CAPELLA INCIDENT 
The West Capella Incident is the most recent maritime standoff in the South China 
Sea that began in October of 2019 involving China, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The West 
Capella is a British vessel that operated under contract with Malaysia’s state-owned oil 
exploration company Petronas.174 The incident began after the West Capella initiated in 
October 2019 its oil survey operations off the coast of Malaysia’s Sabah state and can be 
viewed as a direct maritime challenge made by the Mahathir administration to China’s 
nine-dash line claims in the South China Sea.175 
On December 6, 2019, two Chinese Coast Guard ships the Haijing 5202 and Haijing 
5403 began harassing the West Capella’s operations.176 During the same time of the 
operations, on December 12, 2019, Malaysia submitted a new continental shelf claim to 
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the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that would 
extend Malaysia’s continental shelf beyond the original 200 nautical miles from its 
country’s baselines.177 Although indirectly related to the West Capella incident, the 
significance of this submission was that it was the first of a series of note verbales 
submissions followed by other claimant countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia that explicitly rejected China’s nine-dash line claim.178 In response to 
Malaysia’s submission, China quickly issued a note verbale repeating its prior claim that 
it had historic rights to the entire South China Sea.179 Despite China’s continued protest 
against the West Capella’s operations, on December 21, 2019, the vessel completed its 
initial survey in the ND-4 oil exploratory block and moved toward its next exploratory 
block ND-2 located within the jointly claimed zone claimed by both Malaysia and 
Vietnam.180 The Chinese Coast Guard vessel Haijing 5203 arrived on scene immediately 
after the West Capella had entered the jointly claimed zone, harassing the West Capella’s 
operations by maneuvering at high speeds toward the surveying vessel during its 
operations.181 At the same time, two Vietnamese vessels that were not broadcasting their 
Automated Identification System (AIS), a requirement for vessels operating at sea, were 
also present observing and demanding that the West Capella leave the jointly claimed 
area.182 
In January 2020, Malaysia militarily responded to China’s Coast Guard vessel 
harassment by deploying its own KD Jebat, a frigate, to assist with guarding the West 
Capella and its supply ships.183 While the KD Jebat only patrolled the area for 3 days 
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before returning to its port, this did apparently persuade the Chinese Coast Guard Haijing 
5203 to momentarily cease its harassment of the West Capella.184 On January 12, 2020, 
the West Capella left the jointly claimed area and proceeded to the ND-2 oil exploration 
block.185 At this time, another Chinese Coast Guard vessel the Haijing 5305 took over 
duties of monitoring the West Capella, while the Haijing 5203 returned to the Luconia 
Shoals to disrupt the Sapura company’s oil and gas operation surveys in that area.186 
However, on January 20, 2020, the West Capella proceeded to a new location in the ND-1 
oil exploration block that was also located within the jointly claimed area, leading to further 
harassment from the Haijing 5305.187 On January 26, 2020, Malaysia deployed a smaller 
coastal patrol vessel the KD Kelantan to assist in guarding the West Capella during its 
operations in the contested area until February 3rd.188 However, the KD Kelantan was 
quickly relieved by another coastal patrol vessel KM Bagan Datuk within a few days.189 
Vietnam’s vessels maintained an observational presence within the contested area during 
the entire duration of West Capella’s survey operations, continuing to call on West Capella 
to halt its oil survey operations and depart the contested area.190 On February 16, 2020, 
the Haijing 5203 left its patrolling of Luconia Shoals and was replaced by a larger Chinese 
Coast Guard ship the Haijing 5204.191 
During the same time of the survey vessel standoff, the Malaysian government 
encountered a political crisis that led to a critical government transition from the Pakatan 
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Harapan (PH) government to the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government, resulting in a 
dynamic shift to a more non-confrontational foreign policy stance toward China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea.192 For instance, in March of 2020 the PN 
government’s Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein stated that “the government 
remained committed to resolving its South China Sea disputes with China through 
diplomacy and not by force.”193 Consequently, on March 12, 2020, China’s Premier Li 
Keqiang responded that “he looked forward to working with Malaysia’s new prime 
minister and improving both countries’ diplomatic ties.”194 However, during this time, 
Malaysia experienced a country-wide coronavirus lockdown that disrupted potential 
diplomatic collaboration between both countries and shifted Malaysia’s focus again to its 
immediate domestic concerns.195 
On April 9, 2020, the Haiying Dizhi 8 left Sanya port on China’s Hainan island 
with its escorts consisting of six Chinese Coast Guard ships.196 On April 14, 2020, the 
Haiyang Dizhi 8 and its escorts transited within 92 nautical miles of Vietnam’s coastlines 
as reported by their AIS shipboard tracking systems.197 During this time, Vietnam was in 
a 15-day lockdown due to the outbreak of coronavirus within the country.198 Despite the 
lockdown, Vietnam still deployed three of its law enforcement vessels to shadow the 
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Haiyang Dizhi 8 and its escorts as they transited through Vietnam’s EEZ.199 Additionally, 
Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang issued a verbal statement 
that “Vietnam sincerely wishes that countries’ legitimate, justifiable rights, and interests 
are respected in accordance with UNCLOS.”200 In response to Vietnam’s diplomatic 
protests against the Haiyang Dizhi 8, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian 
stated that “The Haiyang Dizhi 8 was conducting normal activities in waters that are 
administered by China,” once again signaling China’s beliefs of its own indisputable rights 
to the South China Sea.201 
On April 15, 2020, after exiting Vietnam’s EEZ the Haiyang Dizhi 8 began its own 
oil survey operations approximately 80 nautical miles away from the West Capella’s 
survey operations, entering Malaysia’s EEZ the following day.202 On April 17, 2020, the 
Haiying Dizhi 8 began aggressively shadowing the West Capella’s operations, in order to 
duplicate its survey operations within the same area.203 Despite China’s violation of its 
EEZ, the Malaysian government did not immediately respond nor did it lodge any 
diplomatic protests.204 However, the head of the MMEA Zubil Mat Som, publicly stated 
that Malaysia did not know why the Haiying Dizhi 8 was operating in Malaysian waters, 
but that the Chinese survey vessel was not breaking any laws.205 The United States 
diplomatically condemned China’s actions as taking advantage of Southeast Asian 
countries during the global pandemic and in response ordered joint military exercises to be 
completed near the Haiyang Dizhi 8 while it was executing its survey operations.206 On 
April 18, 2020, the USS America (LHA-6), USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), and USS Barry 
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(DDG-52) conducted joint exercises with the Australian ship the HMAS Parramatta near 
the ongoing standoff.207 On April 23, 2020, Foreign Minister Hussein formally released 
Malaysia’s first official diplomatic statement regarding the West Capella standoff stating 
that “the presence of multiple warships within the vicinity has the potential to increase 
tensions within the South China Sea, and may result in a miscalculation affecting the 
stability in the region.”208 Hussein further added that “matters relating to the South China 
Sea should be peacefully resolved through diplomacy based on the principles of 
UNCLOS.”209 
Following the Haiying Dizhi 8 incident, Malaysia’s former Foreign Minister 
Anifah Aman criticized the current Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s response to 
China’s violation of Malaysia’s EEZ and for allowing the Chinese survey vessel to conduct 
its own operations, stating that his diplomatic response was too soft.210 In addition, Aman 
stated that only a consistent stance against China’s maritime assertiveness would deter their 
violations going forward.211 Soon after the West Capella incident, the Malaysian 
government strengthened its diplomatic ties with China once again, by appointing a new 
special envoy to China.212 China’s state media sources also disregarded the West Capella 
incident and focused its media coverage on its extensive coronavirus relief efforts it was 
providing to Malaysia.213 On April 24, 2020, both the USS America (LHA-6) and USS 
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Barry (DDG-52) departed the area following Foreign Minister Hussein’s remarks.214 On 
May 12, 2020, the West Capella officially completed its oil exploration activities.215 
Subsequently, China’s Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey vessel loitered 230 nautical miles off 
Malaysia’s coast for three days completing its own oil surveys before officially departing 
the region on May 15, 2020.216 
The Malaysian government responded to the West Capella incident in a similar way 
as the previous government responded, in which its diplomatic response was delayed and 
inconsistent. Similar to the Luconia Shoals incidents, Malaysia’s officials issued 
conflicting diplomatic statements of the current situation within Malaysia’s EEZ. 
Moreover, Malaysian officials also quickly downplayed the West Capella incident in favor 
of quickly restoring their diplomatic ties and economic ties with China, with the goal of 
enhancing the new BN government’s legitimacy. In addition, it is likely that the Hussein 
government foresaw the need to immediately strengthen its economic ties with China due 
to the economic downturn that the coronavirus pandemic inflicted on Malaysia’s domestic 
economy. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Najib administration continuously established closer economic and diplomatic 
ties with China in order to build political legitimacy for his administration and retain 
political support from the business elite class.217 However, while Malaysia has made 
significant progress in developing its economic ties with China, it has been unsuccessful 
in preventing continued Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Currently, Malaysia 
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has become increasingly fearful of China’s economic coercion because it has witnessed 
other countries that have been negatively affected from China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI).218 Evidence was found during research that illustrated that economic coercion has 
indeed occurred in Malaysia which contributes to unsuccessful outcomes. Moreover, this 
can be shown in 2013 when Malaysia continuously allowed China to violate its EEZ for 
almost two years at the Luconia Shoals. Research also indicates that Malaysia’s pandemic 
economic recovery and its preexisting economic ties with China could also make it more 
susceptible to increased Chinese economic coercion in the future. 
This research did not find any evidence to support the hypothesis that increased 
coercive diplomacy against China’s assertiveness leads to more successful outcomes in the 
South China Sea. Overall, Malaysia has yet to pursue an aggressive military response 
against China’s violations of Malaysia’s EEZ. In addition, Malaysia’s military and MMEA 
responses have been accommodative, in which they have deployed vessels for only a short 
duration of time to observe China’s violation of their EEZ. In addition, each of the previous 
incidents at Luconia Shoals prompted a similar response to China’s EEZ violations, which 
ultimately led to numerous unsuccessful outcomes with China. Finally, the Mahathir 
government’s decision to deploy the West Capella within the jointly claimed area of both 
Malaysia and Vietnam for oil survey operations, is likely the most assertive action that 
Malaysia has taken within the South China Sea. In addition, it also appears this action led 
to China eventually withdrawing its own oil survey vessel, which makes the West Capella 
incident a modestly successful outcome for Malaysia. 
Research also indicates that Malaysia performed limited bandwagoning with China 
and is currently lightly hedging between the United States and China. Moreover, this is 
because Malaysia’s ruling elites seek to maximize economic and military benefits from 
their country’s relationship with China, and because Malaysia’s economic prosperity 
reassures the Malaysian population that its leaders have legitimacy. Malaysia has reached 
agreements for defense cooperation with countries such as Japan and India, but because 
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these are limited, they amount to a weak form of external balancing. Malaysia also places 
a low priority on issues involving sovereignty in distant seas with uncertain benefit and 
instead prioritizes the clear value of present and future trade and investment. Overall, 
Malaysia’s behavior can best be described as a light hedging strategy in which it seeks to 
not formally align itself with any great power, due to persistent fears of being trapped in a 
conflict between the United States and China. 
Limited evidence was found during research supporting the hypothesis that stronger 
diplomatic support from the international community leads to more successful outcomes. 
Many of the Luconia Shoals incidents have had very limited coverage by Malaysia’s media 
in order to avoid angering China. However, social media was utilized in order to 
internationalize China’s incursions during the 2015 Luconia Shoals incident. Research also 
indicates that Malaysia like China, views direct bilateral negotiations as the preferred 
method in resolving maritime territorial disputes between the two countries. Finally, it is 
important to highlight that Malaysia did seek international support for its South China Sea 
claims, by filing the first note verbale to the CLCS that explicitly rejected China’s nine-
dash line claim.219 In addition, Malaysia’s submission was ultimately successful in gaining 















This thesis has explained why some Southeast Asian countries’ responses to 
Chinese actions in the South China Sea have been more successful than others. This 
concluding chapter identifies four factors that were determined through case study analysis 
to have yielded success for the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as modest success for 
Malaysia. Additionally, this chapter will also illustrate that since 2014 Southeast Asian 
countries have been less successful when facing China’s assertiveness in the South China 
Sea, based on the most recent incidents of Vanguard Bank and the West Capella. Moreover, 
this chapter will also describe how increased external balancing may hold a promise for 
success in the future depending on how it is employed. This chapter will also discuss 
implications for the future of the South China Sea disputes, suggest U.S. policy 
recommendations, and identify future areas for research. 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSION 
During this thesis research, four hypotheses were explored in order to identify 
potential factors that could contribute to more successful responses to China’s assertiveness 
in the South China Sea. The evidence found for the first hypothesis— that increased 
external balancing with the United States leads to more successful outcomes—was 
extremely weak. In fact, during case study analysis it was discovered that the Philippines 
was the only country that had pursued some formal, robust external balancing with the 
United States through its repairing of alliances. Although Vietnam has allowed the United 
States’ ships to dock in Vietnamese ports and acquired a U.S. Coast Guard vessel and six 
patrol boats, these are quite modest steps toward “alignment.” Further, it has not formed 
an official military alliance with the United States. In addition, Vietnam seems unlikely to 
formally align itself with any great power because it does not want to anger China or 
undermine stability within the region, and doing so would also go against its own domestic 
policy of the “Three No’s,” which explicitly precludes such a step. 
Likewise, Malaysia has also received United States’ defense equipment such as a 
U.S. coastal defense system and U.S. coastal patrol vessels. However, similar to Vietnam, 
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Malaysia’s domestic politics also heavily influences how it will respond to China’s 
violations of its EEZ and how it views China as a threat. Many of Malaysia’s ruling elites 
view China as a minimal maritime threat that can be managed through light hedging and 
by seeking international support for its claims by submitting them to the CLCS. 
Additionally, many of Malaysia’s elites view the country’s future economic prosperity as 
tied to rising economic cooperation with China, which provides Malaysian elites with an 
incentive to further economic ties with China to reinforce their own political legitimacy. 
It is also important to note that Vietnam and Malaysia have both consciously tried 
to avoid external balancing with the United States as well as with other countries, even in 
times of a South China Sea crisis. However, external balancing with the United States could 
still be a possible option for both countries in the future. This would, however, require each 
country to heavily reevaluate its current domestic politics and whether to pursue an external 
alliance-based strategy. 
Moderate evidence was found for the hypothesis that increased internal balancing 
leads to more successful outcomes. While it is true that both Vietnam and Malaysia have 
strengthened their maritime defense capabilities, neither of these countries has overly 
invested in a massive military expansion during the last ten years, as China has. This 
exacerbates the asymmetric position the countries find themselves in against China’s 
growing maritime capabilities. In turn, limited internal balancing like insufficient external 
balancing makes it difficult for each country to achieve a successful outcome with China. 
This is also illustrated by Vietnam’s increasing reliance on acquiring additional defense 
equipment from other countries, such as the United States, India, and Japan in order to 
continually modernize its own maritime defense capabilities. As a result, Vietnam’s 
inadequate maritime capabilities leads to a perpetual spiral, in which the purchase of a 
defense partner’s maritime capability indirectly makes Vietnam more dependent on that 
country’s maritime defense technology in the future. 
Similarly, Malaysia also suffers from inadequate maritime defense capabilities but 
for different reasons. First, most of its defense budget is devoted to military operational 
funding, in order to sustain its own military forces. Secondly, it is also not economically 
feasible that Malaysia could devote adequate investments into developing its maritime 
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capabilities to sufficiently counter China’s advanced maritime forces. Thirdly, Malaysia 
also differs from Vietnam because Malaysia still views land-based threats, such as terrorist 
organizations and illegal border crossings, as the primary type of threat. This leads to 
Malaysia’s Army receiving most of the operational budget, to manage these constant land 
threats. As a result, Malaysia can only devote a minimal amount of funding to improving 
its own maritime capabilities, which has a direct effect on Malaysia’s inability to 
sufficiently deter China’s violations of its EEZ. 
The hypothesis that increased coercive diplomacy against China’s assertiveness 
leads to more successful outcomes was found to have strong evidence in several of the 
analyzed case studies such as the Second Thomas Shoal incident in 2013 and the 2014 
China-Vietnam oil rig incident. In general, much of the evidence demonstrated that 
countries that engaged in the use of increased coercive diplomacy against China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea—by responding more aggressively, deploying their 
own maritime vessels to interdict China after China had violated their EEZ—were more 
successful in compelling China to leave their EEZ. It is also important to note that only the 
Philippines and Vietnam were found to have achieved a successful outcome during a 
maritime dispute with China. Therefore, more aggressive responses to China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea during a crisis was one of the main factors in a 
successful outcome with China. 
Compelling evidence was also found in favor of the fourth hypothesis that stronger 
diplomatic support from the international community leads to more successful outcomes. 
First, it appears that when countries threaten China with legal arbitration, as the Philippines 
did in 2013, China is more likely to withdraw some of its vessels from the country’s EEZ 
in order to prevent the country from further pursuing legal arbitration. Second, countries 
that chose to internationalize the maritime incident by using their own state and 
international media sources had an impact on China’s decision on whether to continually 
violate that country’s EEZ. Third, countries that had involved regional organizations and 
international organizations, such as ASEAN and the United Nations, seemed to have an 
influence on how long China would choose to continually violate a country’s EEZ. 
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The combination of at least three of these four factors resulted in more successful 
outcomes. For example, during the 2013 Second Thomas Shoal incident, the Philippines 
used three of the four factors to persuade China to withdraw some of its vessels outside of 
the Philippines’ EEZ. Using foreign journalists during its resupply of the Sierra Madre, 
the Philippines was able to involve the media by publicizing China’s aggressive actions to 
the world, which appears to have induced China to withdraw some of its vessels to an 
observatory range from the Shoal. Additionally, the publicizing of the incident caught the 
attention of the regional organization of ASEAN at the 24th ASEAN Summit, which led to 
additional harsh criticism of China internationally. The Philippines’ initiation of the 
international arbitration case also appears to have persuaded China to temper its maritime 
response during the Philippines’ scheduled resupply operation of the Sierra Madre. In 
addition, the international arbitration case also appears to have swayed China to offer more 
economic cooperation to the Philippines in exchange for dropping its international 
arbitration case. Although the Philippines’ maritime response was not as aggressive as its 
previous Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, the Philippines was consistent in its maritime 
response and did not momentarily withdraw its vessels as it had done during the 
Scarborough Shoal incident. 
In response to the 2014 oil rig incident, Vietnam employed all four of these factors 
and achieved the most successful response among the cases analyzed in this thesis. 
Vietnam’s response can be considered successful because it resulted in China’s withdrawal 
of the oil rig from Vietnam’s EEZ. Vietnam was able to accomplish this primarily through 
strong appeals to international media. In fact, Vietnam internationalized the incident by 
providing current updates to the international community, which further allowed it to 
receive more diplomatic support from ASEAN members during the 24th ASEAN summit 
and from other regional partners such as the U.S., Australia, and Japan.221 Vietnam also 
reached out to the international community by submitting a formal diplomatic complaint 
regarding the incident to the United Nations. Vietnam’s use of coercive diplomacy by 
deploying several maritime law enforcement ships and their own maritime militia forces 
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to drive China’s oil rig out of their respective EEZ, directly contributed to its success. 
Finally, similar to the Philippines, Vietnam also threatened legal arbitration against China, 
which led to further internationalization of the South China Sea dispute. 
As we have seen, in the earlier period (2013-2014) Southeast Asian countries were 
more successful, and their success came from a combination of at least three of these four 
factors. However, in the more recent (2019-2020) incidents of Vanguard Bank and West 
Capella, they have been modestly successful in persuading Chinese vessels to leave their 
EEZs, likely for several reasons. First, countries have been unwilling to challenge China 
as aggressively as Vietnam did in 2014, which has permitted China to accomplish its goal 
of surveying for natural resources. For instance, during the Vanguard Bank incident 
Vietnam initially responded aggressively by deploying its maritime enforcement vessels. 
However, once Vietnam’s vessels had located China’s Haiyang Dizhi 8 oil survey vessel, 
they merely observed China’s oil survey vessel and did not attempt to obstruct its 
operations. Vietnam also did not publicize the Vanguard Bank incident like the previous 
2014 oil rig incident. Instead, they chose to minimize international and state media 
coverage. Vietnam also did not involve other countries in the region or the international 
community like it did during the 2014 oil rig incident. Vietnam’s unwillingness to employ 
the same tactics it has used in 2014, directly contributed to a modestly successful outcome 
with China in 2019. 
Malaysia’s responses during the West Capella incident were also not aggressive 
and can be viewed as more accommodative in nature. In fact, while Malaysia did deploy 
some of its naval frigates and coastal patrol vessels, it also did not attempt to directly 
intervene in the Haiyang Dizhi 8’s seismic survey operations. Instead, most of Malaysia’s 
vessels only observed the oil survey operations of the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and its escorts, as 
the West Capella continued its own survey operations in the area. Similar to Vietnam, 
Malaysia also minimized media coverage of the incident and did not seek to involve other 
countries such as the United States or ASEAN members in its response. In addition, 
Malaysia also did not submit any official statements regarding the ongoing incident until 
six months after the incident had begun, which further contributed to a modestly successful 
outcome for Malaysia. 
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Since 2014, it appears that Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Malaysia 
have generally been deterred from directly challenging China. This seems to be because 
China’s maritime power capabilities have substantially increased since then, resulting in 
China’s ability to maintain a greater number of Chinese maritime forces deployed within 
the South China Sea, and thus is likely an important, contributing factor to the outcomes in 
West Capella and Vanguard Bank. China’s construction of its artificial islands in 2014 also 
seems to have contributed to their ability to provide for greater sustainment of their 
maritime forces, allowing for consistent Chinese maritime presence within the region. 
Finally, Vietnam and Malaysia have also not reached out to involve other countries 
within the region or extra regional partners such as the United States, Australia, or Japan 
in both the Vanguard Bank and West Capella Incidents. Instead, both of these countries 
have individually decided to face China’s incursion within their EEZ without seeking 
military assistance from foreign countries. Additionally, during both of these maritime 
incidents the United States has unilaterally involved itself in the disputes by denouncing 
China’s actions through various diplomatic statements. It is also important to highlight that 
although the United States did not involve itself militarily during the Vanguard Bank 
incident, the U.S. did individually involve itself during the West Capella dispute by 
completing joint maritime exercises with Australia within the vicinity, in order to deter 
China from further escalating the maritime dispute. Therefore, it is possible that if 
Southeast Asian countries choose to increase their external balancing with the United 
States and other regional allies, this could enable a stronger alliance to be formed which 
could possibly deter China from further escalating maritime disputes. Moreover, increased 
external balancing with the U.S. could also allow for more rapid acquisitions of maritime 
defense capabilities between these countries, which could be later utilized against China’s 
increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
DISPUTES AND U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Many of these previously discussed case studies illustrate that China will continue 
to claim that it has indisputable sovereignty in the South China Sea and its undiscovered 
resources and will disrupt any claimant state that seeks to complete its own exploration 
57 
without involving China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the future, this will have 
implications for the United States, its regional partners such as India, Australia, and Japan, 
as well as the South China Sea claimant states. In turn, China’s continued assertiveness 
will push the United States to become even more involved in the region, working in 
cooperation with regional partners to ensure that the principles of international law are 
upheld in the South China Sea. In addition, the increased U.S. involvement could certainly 
have positive implications for claimant states and their renewed diplomatic relationship 
with the United States. In turn, this could also result in the U.S. encouraging all claimant 
countries to take a stronger maritime stance against China’s assertiveness. However, as 
noted, several claimant states do not possess the domestic defense capabilities to face the 
increasing China threat alone in the South China Sea and cannot formally align with the 
U.S. for fear of angering China and their own domestic politics. Moreover, the U.S. going 
forward must understand these complicated relationships claimant states have with China 
and also work to repair its own diplomatic reputation within the region. The United States’ 
increased involvement in the region will also have implications for ASEAN, by allowing 
more senior leaders of Southeast Asian countries to meet with the U.S. more frequently to 
discuss regional issues such as the CoC and other maritime security issues. China’s 
continuous disruptions of foreign oil companies’ exploration rights could also have 
implications for other countries to become involved in the South China Sea disputes, in 
order to safeguard their financial interests, which could raise the potential for conflict. 
However, there are several recommendations the United States could implement in its 
current policy in the South China Sea that would be effective in the future. 
First, the United States should continue to express its current position is in 
accordance with international law and respects the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 
decision, most explicitly articulated in 2020.222 The U.S. should also continue to increase 
its maritime presence within the South China Sea, despite not receiving official formal 
requests from Southeast Asian nations to do so. The reason is that both Southeast Asian 
 
222 Michael Pompeo, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” United States 
Department of State (blog), July 13, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-
south-china-sea/. 
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countries as well as many other countries in the world are deeply reliant on their maritime 
trade which must pass through this critical shipping area. In turn, an increased U.S. 
maritime presence within the South China Sea will provide greater reassurance to 
Southeast Asian countries as well as other countries, by reaffirming that the U.S. has a 
vested interest in ensuring that maritime international laws are continually upheld, despite 
new challenges created by China. 
Second, on a diplomatic level, the United States should increase its current 
involvement in the multilateral regional organization of ASEAN, as well as increase its 
individual diplomatic support to each country involved in the South China Sea disputes, 
which could enable for more external balancing to occur. Over the years, America’s official 
diplomatic presence within Southeast Asia has been in decline, which has casted doubt in 
some Southeast Asian countries’ opinions of the United States’ commitments in the region. 
To negate this, the U.S. could increase its senior leadership attendance at the ASEAN 
summit, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus 
(ADMM+) and the East Asian Summit (EAS) meetings. Additionally, the U.S. could 
increase its individual diplomatic support with each country in the region, which would 
reassure our diplomatic commitments to our regional allies. With an increased presence 
diplomatically, the United States will show that it is a committed partner to the code of 
conduct (CoC) negotiations, committed to peace and stability within the region, and that it 
will ensure that the principles of international law are upheld. 
Third and finally, on a military level, the United States could recommend to 
ASEAN members and its regional partners a mutual assistance policy that would allow 
other ASEAN members and regional partners to jointly respond militarily. In practice, this 
policy could encourage an increase in the frequency of annual joint exercises such as the 
current Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the Southeast Asia 
Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercises. Currently, the CARAT exercise allows 
for coordinated sea evolutions which teach Southeast Asian countries how to track vessels, 
how to conduct increased missile defense, and how to perform coordinated shipboard 
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maneuvers with other countries.223 The SEACAT exercise also provides detailed 
workshops on maritime security as well as a practical at-sea exercise within the South 
China Sea, which helps to solidify the joint maritime workshop training.224 Increasing the 
frequency of these joint exercises by making them biannual would not only increase 
coordination between Southeast Asian countries but could also empower them with the 
training needed to enable a combined regional response to China’s assertiveness in future 
crises. In addition, the U.S. could also extend its invitation of these joint exercises to other 
countries such as India, Australia, and Japan which would allow for greater maritime 
cooperation between allies. Ultimately, the U.S. should understand that it must respond to 
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea by engaging in a multilateral approach with 
its regional partners, that is both collaborative and cooperative, in order to successfully 
assist in the resolving of the South China Sea disputes with ASEAN claimant states. If 
employed correctly, this policy approach could assist in the prevention of a great power 
conflict with China in the future. 
C. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH  
During the completion of this research, it was discovered that both Vietnam and 
Malaysia have completed several defense arrangements for military personnel training on 
several different land and air military platforms with other middle powers such as India 
and Australia. Future research could be completed on whether the increased involvement 
of other middle powers such as India and Australia with other Southeast Asian countries 
will enable Southeast Asian countries to respond more assertively against China’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
Additionally, this research was completed during the time of the coronavirus 
pandemic and was not able to see how the coronavirus pandemic has affected future 
defense funding for these selected Southeast Asian countries. Future research could be 
 
223 Prashanth Parameswaran, “US-Brunei Defense Ties in Focus with Military Exercise in South 
China Sea,” The Diplomat (November 2018):1. ProQuest. 
224 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Maritime Security Exercise Highlights US-Indo-Pacific Defense Ties,” 
The Diplomat, last modified August 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/maritime-security-exercise-
highlights-us-indo-pacific-defense-ties/. 
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performed on how global pandemics affect internal balancing and external balancing 
within Southeast Asian countries and whether this has a detrimental impact on how 
countries respond to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea in the future. 
Finally, many countries within Southeast Asia perceive China’s growing military 
influence within the region differently. Future research could also be completed on why 
some Southeast Asian countries view China’s rising military influence within the South 
China Sea as a direct military threat, while other countries view China’s increasing military 
role in the region as an opportunity to improve their own country’s military forces with 
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